How strategic failures and complacency undermined Ukraine and emboldened Russia

Introduction

With ongoing speculation regarding a peace deal in Ukraine, it looks increasingly likely that territorial concessions will have to be made to Russia by the Ukrainian side to achieve peace. Whilst a loss of land due to the aggressive actions of another nation-state is a grave warning to the international order, this outcome has been years in the making — largely a consequence of NATO’s own strategic missteps. In dealing with Russia, Western nations have been naïve. This has been compounded by their long-standing inability to pull their own weight with regard to defence. These mistakes have created an aura of vulnerability around the alliance, a weakness that could be exploited in the future.

NATO’s strategic blind spot

A persistent failure in tactical thinking by NATO has been a key factor in Ukraine and Western countries entering peace talks with a weak hand. Hawks in the West have mishandled Russia at every step, pushing it into a corner then subsequently failing to back Ukraine when faced by Russian aggression. What initially started as a static war in 2014 between Ukraine and separatists backed by Russia, notably in Donbass and Crimea, has escalated into a proxy war between NATO and Russia fought in Ukraine.

From a Russian perspective, defence is achieved through holding territory or creating buffers. The early form of Russia, known as the Grand Principality of Muscovy, found security through expansionism. The first Tsar, Ivan the Terrible, initiated this policy and it was later developed through his successors, notably Peter the Great who first expanded into Siberia and then Catherine the Great who conquered Crimea. All of this was done to secure the area around Moscow, preventing attacks from the West — such as Sweden’s invasion during the Great Northern War or Germany’s in World War II — as well as from the East, as seen with the Mongol invasion in the 13th century. This expansion saw Russia become the largest nation on Earth, whilst its successful test of nuclear weapons in 1949 saw it elevate itself to the rank of global superpower. Understanding Russia’s geography, its history, and the way that it perceives itself helps give us an insight into their mindset, something NATO has failed to do.

Several members of either NATO or the EU such as Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, and Albania were once part of the Soviet-led mutual defence alliance, the Warsaw Pact. From a Russian point of view, the collapse of the Soviet Union followed by the EU and NATO’s push to expand eastward can be seen as a potential threat to its heartlands. When former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown in 2014 after rejecting a deal with the EU in favour of closer ties with Russia, the threat of losing a pro-Russian government in Kiev meant a threat to Russian security itself. The prospect of a pro-Western Government in Ukraine meant the removal of a buffer, potentially creating a near 1,500-mile border with NATO, as well as the loss of the lease held on the warm-water port in Sevastopol. The idea that Russia would stand idle whilst Ukraine pushed to join Western institutions was foolish. For a country like Russia, which sees itself as a great power, any move that undermines its influence in its near abroad is deemed unacceptable.

Hesitation signals weakness

This naivety about Russia’s reaction to events in Ukraine can be seen in NATO’s wider misunderstanding of the Russian mindset, specifically with how it carries out warfare. Mistakes made in the initial stages of the invasion have been compounded, which has in turn undermined both Ukraine’s and NATO’s position. Russian military doctrine tends to focus on paralysing enemy command structures through the use of special forces and the seizure of airfields in enemy territory. This was clearly the strategy attempted in the early stage of fighting in 2022 as Russian airborne troops attempted to seize Hostomel Airport located just outside Kyiv with the goal of airlifting in reinforcements, storming Kyiv, and either capturing or killing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Unable to destroy Ukraine’s leadership, Russia reverted back to type militarily by turning the conflict into a war of attrition. A slow, grinding offensive centred around the Donbas relying on artillery and sheer manpower suited Russia. This shift in the war could have proved an opportunity for Ukraine and NATO. However, when faced with Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, Western countries failed to give Ukraine sufficient weapons early, signalling their fear of escalating the war.

The cautious approach shown in the early stages of the conflict resulted in extensive deliberation before committing to significant military aid. This protracted decision making saw critical delays which hampered Ukraine's ability to mount an effective defence, with former United States President Joe Biden’s being reluctant to provide long-range missile systems to Ukraine due to fears of provoking a broader conflict with Russia. Only when significant pressure mounted did the US belatedly authorise the delivery of these systems. The delayed arrival of these weapons lost valuable time and allowed Russian forces to fortify their positions, making it harder for Ukrainian forces to reclaim occupied territories.

This delay not only affected the immediate tactical situation, but had wider strategic ramifications. When talking about Russia, former UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill once said, “There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than weakness, especially military weakness." NATO’s hesitancy in arming Ukraine only reinforced the perception of weakness, emboldening Russia and inviting further aggression.

European complacency and US dependence

To compound mishaps in dealing with Russia, another considerable mistake has been decades in the making. Since its inception, NATO has depended heavily on the US for military leadership and resources. This dependency has led to a complacency among European member states regarding their own defence investments. A disproportionate reliance on US military expenditure has created vulnerabilities within the group. Historically this has always been the case, with figures indicating that the US contributes approximately 70% of the alliance's defence expenditures. This imbalance has led to criticism by US President Trump who said back in 2017 that, "NATO is obsolete. And it's extremely expensive to the United States, disproportionately so. We should readjust NATO." Time and again over the past decade, NATO has failed to address this fundamental weakness, resulting in the alliance appearing increasingly fragile, with internal unity seemingly strained.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine should have been a long-overdue wake-up call for European strategists. As recently as 2023, only seven out of 30 NATO members had met the pledge to allocate at least 2% of their GDP to defence, despite the target being set back in 2014. Although nations have since stepped up efforts, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte now believes that this figure is not enough and is urging members to spend more than 3% of GDP on defence. Elsewhere, US President Trump is pushing for a figure as high as 5%. European nations, unprepared for a large-scale military engagement in their own backyard, showed themselves to be slow to respond to Russia's aggression. This sluggishness can be put down to years of underinvestment in defence capabilities, leaving European allies ill-equipped to deter or respond effectively to threats without substantial US support. A belated increase in defence spending may serve to plug a few holes, but the consequences of this overreliance on the US puts the future of European security at risk.

Conclusion

NATO's mishandling of Russia coupled with an overreliance on US military support has had profound implications on the alliance's credibility and security in Europe. In the eastward expansion of institutions like NATO and the EU, the West poked the Russian bear, then acted surprised when it growled. In failure to respond to Russian aggression by backing Ukraine, it taught the bear that growling — and even biting — comes with little consequence.

With an increasingly isolationist US, Europeans must recognise that they don't have any choice but to accept more burden when it comes to regional security. Through its size, manpower, and industry, Russia can handle the losses suffered in the war, Ukraine cannot. Elsewhere, hopes that sanctions would shut the Russian economy down have been dashed. To try and rectify the situation, a reassessment of NATO's priorities and a renewed commitment to shared defence responsibilities are imperative to ensure similar mistakes are not repeated.

NATO can no longer afford to be naïve in dealing with Russia. If peace talks legitimise Russia’s control over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, then Ukraine risks becoming little more than a buffer state — left without full NATO membership but given vague defence guarantees. This would hand Russia a strategic advantage, allowing it to build its military presence along the alliance’s northeastern flank in the Baltics. With Russian President Vladimir Putin’s health long a subject of speculation, his eventual successor will inherit a Russia emboldened by past Western missteps. If the failures of the last decade are repeated, it will all but invite Moscow’s next move — perhaps in the Baltics, where the stakes will be even higher.